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Abstract 
This short perspective article discusses the effect of a start-up firm's capital structure on the nature 
and degree of competition in the marketplace. Specifically, the article argues that the nature of 
financing availed by the start-up firms expose them to the risk of predatory price-based competition 
from a well-capitalized competitor. The staged model of capital infusion works best when tangible 
progress can be demonstrated at every new round of financing. Indian start-up firms need to 
acknowledge this fact, pursue innovations that complement the local realities and develop a distinct 
local model that justifies the need for additional capital.   
  
There exist various definitions for a start-up firm with limited convergence. Some definitions are 
based on metrics of age, growth, revenue and profitability while others prefer to use metrics of 
novelty and scalability. The department of industrial policy and promotion defines start-up as 
company “working towards innovation, development, deployment or commercialization of new 
products, processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property” that is less than five 
years old and has a revenue of less than Rupees 25 Crores in a year (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, 2016). The start-up firms, new entities with novel business models, in India witnessed a 
record capital investment in the year 2015 at USD 8.2 billion and a start-up was funded at every 10 
hours on an average considering 890 deals consummated during the year (KPMG, 2016). But the 
willingness to invest in Indian start-ups has decreased significantly since then and the total 
investment in the year 2016 at USD 3.3 billion was lower by 60 percent. A number of promising 
start-ups of 2015 shuttered while others retrenched employees (Ayyar, 2016). Investors in many of 
these firms are urging management teams to contain costs and concentrate on profitability metrics 
instead of driving customer acquisition volume to gain scale. The focus is back on the resilience of 
the business models and the sky-high valuations used for the recent round of financings are marked 
down by investors (Sen, 2017). Concerns are being raised that many business models are 
unsustainable without raising additional funds from investors and a mark-down of prior investments 
makes additional fund raising a challenging task. It is in this context that certain start-up firms have 
requested a government intervention to prevent ‘capital dumping’ by certain foreign firms 
(Chanchani, 2016). These demands that were initially raised the promoters of the start-up firms have 
also received recent support from Indian investors in these firms (Peermohamed, 2017; 
Davda,2016). 
Paradoxically enough, the companies that are looking for government intervention today were 
accused in the past by the unorganised players for causing an appreciable adverse effect on 
competition by creating product specific monopoly leading to manipulation of price, control of 
production and supply (Mohit Manglani versus Flipkart and others, 2014). The proponents of 
government intervention claim that a significant capital infusion by established global firms 
constitute a market manipulation and distort ‘level playing field’
i
 doctrine. They further argue that 
the employment benefits from the growth of global players do not accrue proportionately to local 
labour markets when compared with the benefits from the growth of local players. The opponents 
to such demand argue that the local firms rallying for protection from foreign capital inflow are 
themselves funded by the foreign capital. Therefore, a sudden change in stance for these companies 
is anomalous, to say the least. The opponents also argue that inferior service offering is the primary 
reason for the loss in the market share of local players and the call for protectionism is a convoluted 
effort to restrict the competitors gain in market share. Amidst this cacophony of arguments and 
rhetoric from both sides, we risk the ability to parse through the real issue – effect of a firm’s capital 
structure
ii
 and predatory pricing
iii
 on the nature and degree of competition in the market-place.  
Brander and Lewis (1996) initiated a strand in academic research that analyses the impact of choice 
of capital on the degree of competition. This body of cross-disciplinary research integrates corporate 
finance with strategy and market structure and establishes that financing decisions subsequently 
impact product market outcomes. Specifically, whether firms will accommodate to competitor’s 
strategy without a response or will raise a counter-offence is influenced by their source of funding. 
The start-up firms have traditionally accessed venture capital to pursue their business objectives, 
both globally and in India. The lack of operating history and risk associated with an unproven 
business model restrict a start-up’s access to traditional bank financing. Venture capitalists spend 
time and resources in understanding the technological developments and are better equipped to 
understand the underlying risk. They also provide mentoring and strategic advice to entrepreneurs 
in addition to capital contribution and are often instrumental in structuring exit events in the form of 
initial public offering, sale or a merger.  A typical venture financing arrangement involves a ‘staged 
commitment’ where a capital provider’s continued participation with the enterprise is contingent 
upon firm’s future performance. The first stage of funding that start-ups avail is called seed funding 
or angel funding round. This round of financing enables a company to develop the product or service 
and define its proposed market and targeted users. A seed round helps the company in recruiting 
few employees and in launching an early version of the product or service. This is followed by a 
series ‘A’ funding subject to the acceptance of the product or service offering. Series ‘A’ funding 
enables firms to scale their customer base relying upon geographical diversification and enhanced 
product offerings. Further rounds of financing, denoted by sequential alphabetical letters, are used 
for growth and acquisitions.  This contingent nature of commitment results in two distinct benefits 
for the capital provider. Firstly, it reduces the adverse selection
iv
 problem (Akerlof, 1970) as a firm 
with a belief in its ability to meet promised staged goals is more likely to accept such financing 
arrangements. Secondly, it reduces agency problems
v
 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) related to 
misappropriation or wasteful expenditure of investor funds considering that promoters will need 
continued access to capital providers for ensuring the longevity of their business. The threat of 
termination as it relates to future capital participation serves as an effective incentive mechanism to 
align goals of incumbent management with capital providers. Gompers (1995) finds evidence that 
staging of capital infusion provides the investor with an ‘option to abandon’ and encourages 
information sharing and progress monitoring. The promoters prefer this staged financing 
arrangement believing that their company will be more valuable at a future date and the next round 
of financing will be less dilutive than the current round. But the staged nature of financing also 
creates an extremely valuable strategic opportunity for the competitors. Being aware of the 
contingent nature of funding available to the firm, the competitors will rationally engage in 
strategies that are likely to result in the firm not achieving its promised goals to its investors (Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1990). The constraints on future funding imposed by missing targets will eventually 
drive the firm out of business and will increase competitor’s economic profits. Shliefer and Vishny 
(1997) study the effects of capital constraints in reducing the financial market efficiency by imposing 
limits on arbitrage
vi
. Their staged model of competitive responses in the presence of capital 
constraints and performance-based assessment by providers of future capital makes an interesting 
case for comparison with start-up firms. Venture capitalists routinely review the performance of 
their investee companies and allocate future capital to the firms with better performance. A decline 
in the current period performance may incentivise the management to invest less in the business 
and preserve more cash to deal with the uncertainty of future funding. This cash conservation can 
lead to a vicious cycle where firms continuously underinvest in the product or service offering and 
delay the eventual outcome instead of addressing the competitive positioning. 
The current competitive landscape in Indian start-up ecosystem is an instance of this multi-stage 
dynamics. Equipped with the knowledge that local firms need access to future funding since they are 
operationally unprofitable, global players are rationally attempting to increase the intensity of 
competition. Venture capitalists, that initially funded local players deriving comfort from their first-
mover advantage, are concerned about the slow progress made in achieving operating profitability.  
The past record of local players on missed revenue targets, higher than targeted cash-burn and 
anecdotal stories of excessive remuneration being paid to certain employees is indeed not helpful to 
their cause. It is naïve to expect that the government will offer protection for organised firms and 
their capital partners when it has not done so for the unorganised sector. The literature in 
competitive strategies makes a distinction between innovators and imitators. Hellman and Puri 
(2000) find clear evidence that innovators have a higher likelihood of receiving venture capital 
financing as compared to imitators. A prudent strategic response for local firms at this time will be to 
consider raising the bar by innovating product and service offerings and differentiating themselves 
from the global firms. Replicating successful business models from the developed countries and 
relying upon first-mover advantage and network effects
vii
 to offer a competitive barrier is not an 
optimal strategy in this era of globalisation. This is particularly true in instances where switching 
costs for customers are negligible, suppliers are unconstrained to a network owing to limited 
network benefits and the concept of customer loyalty is utopian. A business with superior customer 
offering will find caterers of capital irrespective of predatory competition as the relevance of price-
based competition becomes marginal in this context. The staged model of capital infusion works 
best when there is a new, promising chapter in the story at every round of financing that justifies 
need for additional capital. Indian firms need to acknowledge this fact, pursue innovations that 
complement the local realities and develop a distinct Indian model. Else, the cries of protectionism 
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i
 Level playing field refers to an economic and legal environment in which all competitors, irrespective of their 
size or financial strength, follow the same rules and get equal opportunity to compete. Level playing field is a 
concept about fairness, not that each player has an equal chance to succeed, but that they all play by the same 
set of rules. A metaphorical playing field is said to be level if no external interference affects the ability of the 
players to compete fairly. 
ii
 A firm's capital structure is the composition of its liabilities. The capital structure defines how a firm finances 
its overall operations and growth by using different sources of funds. 
iii
 Predatory pricing is the act of setting prices low in an attempt to eliminate the competition. Predatory pricing 
is illegal under anti-trust laws, as it makes markets more vulnerable to a monopoly. 
iv
 Adverse selection describes an undesired result due to the situation where one party of a deal has more 
accurate and different information than the other party. The party without the information is worried about 
rigged trades, which occurs when the party who has all the information uses it to their advantage. 
v
 A conflict arising when the agents entrusted to look after the interests of the principals use the authority or 
power for their own benefit instead. 
vi
 Arbitrage is the process of exploiting differences in the price of an asset by simultaneously buying and selling 
it in different venues or forms. 
vii
 A network effect (also known as a network externality) exists when a product's value to the user increases as 
the number of users of the product grows. 
